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AbstractIn this paper we examine the complex relationship between accountability andorganizational learning through a case study with the UK Royal Air Force (RAF).Accountability is a complex and contradictory construct that has both positive andnegative implications for organizational learning. Within the same organization weobserved positive effects of accountability in one organizational learning system, andnegative effects of accountability in another. This case study adds to the organizationallearning and accountability literatures, showing that accountability to hierarchy, ratherthan preventing learning, can actually promote effective learning, making it more likelythat people will report problems quickly and accurately and take follow-up action. Thisonly applies if the learning objectives align with the broader accountability framework,and if reporting on failures will enhance individual reputation. If not, then people willtend to avoid reporting negative events in order to avoid punishment and reputationdamage. Accountability to hierarchy is only negative if it conflicts with the learningobjectives.
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IntroductionThe Nimrod Review was presented to the UK government in 2009 as “an independentreview into the broader issues surrounding the loss of the RAF Nimrod MR2 aircraftXV230 in Afghanistan in 2006” (Haddon-Cave 2009, p1). As a result of this review,named individuals in the RAF are now held legally accountable for issues of air safety.Whilst proposing stronger accountability as a solution, the Nimrod Review discussesboth the potential benefits of accountability as a component of an effective safety cultureand the potential problems posed by accountability that might lead to failure to reporton critical issues where accountability is to hierarchy instead of expertise. Therelationship between learning and accountability is complex and requires furtheranalysis.
Accountability is a prominent topic in the public sector, heralded as a keyprinciple of democratic governance (Schillemans, Van Twist, and Vanhommerig 2013)intended to ensure that public money is used responsibly, and to prevent the abuse ofpower. Public sector agencies are subject to a very high degree of scrutiny andaccountability (Rashman, Withers, and Hartley 2009), and measures to ensureaccountability have significantly increased in recent years (Greiling and Halachmi2013b). Accountability is almost universally held to be desirable. Critical issues remaincontested, though, such as how best to achieve it (Roberts 2002) and even preciselywhat it means (Bovens 2010). Accountability is highly problematic in practice (Messner2009) because it has “multiple and conflicting meanings” (Sinclair 1995, p219) and ischaracterised by contradiction (Joannides 2012). Amongst these contradictions, one ofthe puzzles of accountability is its popularity, “given an empirical track record that
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documents how supposedly accountability-enhancing measures lead to gaming,cheating and slacking, and a decline in moral responsibility and/or intrinsic motivation”(Busuioc and Lodge 2016, p248).
The complexity that accountability presents also applies to OrganizationalLearning, where the expected effect of accountability is mixed. From a learningperspective “accountability is a tool to make governments effective in delivering on theirpromises” (Bovens, Schillemans, and Hart 2008, p225). Accountability is said to enableeffective organizational learning, specifically when defined in terms of “commitment tocorrective action” (Lipshitz, Popper, and Friedman 2002, p85). Learning is particularlyimportant where it relates to safety, offering the opportunity to identify and preventdangerous situations from occurring in the future (Provera, Montefusco, and Canato2010). Without accountability, there is the risk of promoting an ‘anything goes’ culture.However, with accountability and punitive measures, there is an increased risk of peoplenot reporting problems in order to avoid punishment (Jos and Tompkins 2004). Iflearning is suppressed that relates to safety, then the opportunity to prevent harm andeven loss of life is missed. An intrinsic difficulty is that the organization should promotethe surfacing and reporting of errors in a way that enables performance improvement.Accountability can promote effective learning, making it more likely that people willreport problems and take follow up action, yet it can also prevent people from reportingnegative events in order to avoid punishment and reputation damage. The challenge ofmanaging this for organizational learning is therefore “an intricate business that mustbe handled with judgment and care” (Ron, Lipshitz, and Popper 2006, p1078).
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In this paper we investigate this complex issue through a study of the impact ofaccountability on two systems intended to support organizational learning in the UKRoyal Air Force (RAF). As a public sector agency, there are high expectations ofaccountability within the RAF. As an organization that operates aircraft in conflictsituations, there is a clear and significant risk of loss of life to their pilots and aircrew,and to the wider public. Due to the significant risks and public status, the RAFrepresents a high-accountability work context (Vashdi et al. 2007). The two systems weexamine are Air Safety and Air Lessons. The Air Safety Management Plan describes adetailed process to identify, assess, record and undertake actions to mitigate safety-related risks. The Air Lessons framework describes a learning process that should beapplied to all projects, operations and exercises. Air Safety has been significantlyinfluenced by The Nimrod Review (Haddon-Cave 2009), which ultimately led to the legalaccountability of named individuals responsible for safety. For this reason, theaccountability paradox (Jos and Tompkins 2004) might predict that Air Safety would bethe least effective of the two systems. In fact, we find that the Air Safety system isperceived as being significantly more effective. It is applied in a rigorous, transparentway, seeking to identify causes of safety problems and to implement change. In contrast,the Air Lessons system was reported to suffer from a number of challenges: poorattention to detail, a lack of attention to operational failings, and a perceived lack ofcredibility. This paper presents an analysis of these two organisational learning systemsin order to investigate the degree to which accountability explains the differences inperceived performance.
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The next section presents a literature review that defines key elements oforganizational learning and accountability, and analyses their relationship. This isfollowed by a description of the research method and results. The analysis section thendiscusses how the relationship between accountability and organizational learning hasdifferent outcomes in the two RAF systems, presenting a comparison and analysis basedon the multifacet model of organizational learning (Lipshitz et al. 2002). Finally, wediscuss the wider implications for practice.
Literature review: Organizational Learning and AccountabilityThis section will introduce the pertinent literature within the body of work onorganizational learning, and introduce the multifacet model (Lipshitz et al. 2002).Accountability is then discussed, and subsequently analysed in terms of organizationallearning.
Organizational learningOrganizational learning, “the study of the learning processes of and withinorganizations” (Spender 2008, p160) is a critical contributor to competitive advantage(Stata 1989), survival (Lähteenmäki, Toivonen, and Mattila 2001), and firm performance(Jiménez-Jiménez and Sanz-Valle 2011). The imperative to become a learningorganization (Prahalad and Hamel 1990) has been stressed for many years (Argyris1977, 1993; Cangelosi and Dill 1965; Fiol and Lyles 1985; Garvin 1993; De Geus 1988;Senge 1990; Stata 1989; Sugarman 2001). However, despite the rapid growth in thepopularity of ‘organizational learning’ as a subject (Bapuji and Crossan 2004), there hasbeen little agreement amongst scholars on the definition of terms or mechanisms(Crossan, Lane, and White 1999; Friedman, Lipshitz, and Popper 2005; Huber 1991),
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and several philosophical perspectives have been taken by researchers debating what itis, what it means, where it is situated and in what forms it can be identified (Crossan etal. 1999; Easterby-Smith 1997; Easterby-Smith, Crossan, and Nicolini 2000). For reviewsof the literature, see, for example, Bapuji & Crossan (2004); Shipton (2006); Taylor et al.(2010) and Turner, Swart, & Maylor (2013). However, despite the wealth of researchthat has been undertaken on learning and knowledge-sharing, there is still much to beexplored (Foss, Husted, and Michailova 2010; Gagné 2009; Gino and Staats 2015; Wangand Noe 2010).
The public sector context is important to recognise with regards toorganizational learning. Although competitive advantage and firm performance areclearly sound targets in for-profit firms, public sector organizations typically havedifferent objectives. Since organizational learning can provide “extensive analyticalvalue… contributing to the improvement of the understanding of organizations and theiractivities” (Chiva and Alegre 2005, p49) it is very relevant for the public sector as a wayto learn from past experiences and adapt to environmental change (Greiling andHalachmi 2013b). As such, organizational learning research in the public sector is bothimportant and extensive (e.g. Addicott, McGivern, & Ferlie, 2006; Currie & Suhomlinova,2006; Ferlie et al., 2009), although Rashman et al. (2009) argue that it is also lacking.The public sector context is also prominent within the accountability literature and thiswill be discussed shortly.
Research on organizational errors is also a rich and valuable area (e.g. Argyris,1977, 1993). Goodman et al. (2011, p157) write that in this context “Learning refers to
Page 8 of 38
the acquisition of new behaviors and can occur at the individual, unit or organizationallevels.” They develop a multi-level model and differentiate between a ‘prevention’approach and a ‘resilience’ approach. Putz, Schilling, Kluge, & Stangenberg (2013) lookat forms of error detection, coping mechanisms and learning methods, includingindividual behaviours. They use this to develop a questionnaire to evaluate theorganizational learning climate. However, the research to date does not address howone organization can have two systems with seemingly different levels of effectiveness.
Although there have been a wide range of valuable organizational learning modelswithin the literature (e.g. Argote and Miron-Spektor 2011; Crossan, Lane, & White, 1999;Nonaka, 1994; Schilling & Kluge, 2009), we sought to use a model containing elementsmore closely aligned with the particular research context. The multifacet model(Lipshitz et al. 2002) describes the necessary conditions for productive organizationallearning using five facets: contextual, policy, psychological, cultural and structural, andthis is shown in Figure 1.
------insert figure 1 about here------
The structural facet contains organizational learning mechanisms (OLMs) (e.g. the safetysystems we identified) that lead to productive learning. Lipshitz et al. (2002) definedthis as producing ‘valid’ knowledge that leads to action. This aligns with the practicalemphasis of the behavioural school within the literature (e.g. Chakravarthy 1982; Levitt& March 1988; Nelson & Winter 1982), and these twin criteria are important in ourcontext. The cultural facet incorporates transparency, integrity, issue orientation(focusing on the relevance of the information), inquiry (persisting until full
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understanding is obtained), and accountability. They argue that accountability forlearning leads to finding out what went wrong in order to avoid errors in the future. Theauthors here use examples from the Israeli Air Force, strengthening the links with ourresearch. Only the multifacet model explicitly includes accountability as a component ofproductive organizational learning. Here, accountability is defined as “assumingresponsibility for both learning and implementing lessons learned” (Lipshitz et al. 2002,p86).
The psychological facet includes the issues of psychological safety (Edmondson 1999,2008) in promoting a ‘safe’ environment with a lack of defensive routines (Argyris1977). This is important in a safety-critical environment as fear of the consequences ofspeaking up may silence employees (Kish-Gephart et al. 2009), therefore hinderinglearning. Lipshitz et al. (2002) do also note that any inquiry that may expose failings orfault might induce defensive routines, and that integrity is key for people to proceeddespite this threat. Similarly, Schwartz (2011) argues that neither rules nor incentivescan ever fully resolve the issues that inevitably arise with human interaction, and positsthat ‘practical wisdom’ – the moral will and moral skill to do the right thing - isrequired. These issues are included in the discussion of psychological safety as arequired element of productive learning. This is interwoven with the idea oforganizational commitment, whereby organizational members identify with theorganization’s goals, and this is especially pertinent in a military context.
The policy facet acknowledges a tolerance for error (management’s major contributionto psychological safety), together with a commitment to learning, vital in situations
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where lives are put at risk. The authors specifically cite Air Force after-action reviews asan example of this (see also Darling, Parry, & Moore, 2005). This is supported by acommitment to the workforce, understood as fairness and supporting employmentsecurity.
Finally, the contextual facet focuses on exogenous factors and contains a number of keyaspects. Error criticality refers to the immediacy and seriousness of potential errors (ofgreat significance in air safety), environmental uncertainty to the rate of changeexperienced (e.g. Maylor, Turner, & Murray-Webster, 2013); task structure to thefeasibility of obtaining accurate information, and proximity to core mission to thecloseness of the learning task to the organization’s main function. Finally, committedleadership is identified as being central to the success of the endeavour in question. Theelements of the Lipshitz et al. (2002) model appear to be highly relevant for the airsafety context, and this is supported by the use of Air Force data by the authors.
Following a review of accountability, we demonstrate how this model was usedin the analysis of our empirical data.
AccountabilityAccountability is almost universally held to be desirable, and in part this reflects itsapparently simplicity: accountable individuals must answer for their actions and beresponsible for the consequences (Roberts 2002). As a key principle of democraticgovernance (Schillemans et al. 2013), measures to improve accountability havesignificantly increased in recent years (Greiling and Halachmi 2013b). However,“despite substantial expansion of the amount and scope of public accountability,
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government responsiveness, efficiency, and effectiveness have not significantlyimproved” (Greiling and Halachmi 2013b, p380). At the same time, the quest for betteraccountability in the public sector is now stronger than ever (Greiling and Halachmi2013a). So, whilst accountability appears simple in theory, there are a number ofproblems and conflicts that become apparent when accountability is operationalised(e.g. Lindkvist and Llewellyn, 2003). The nature of accountability is now presented,followed by four key difficulties.
Defining accountability
Here we present two models of accountability. The first is referred to here as
instrumental accountability, which is “the obligation to explain and justify conduct”(Bovens 2007, p450); it is “to have to answer for one's actions or inaction… and to beresponsible for their consequences” (Roberts 2002, p658); or “the power to demandanswers and to apply sanctions” (McKernan 2012, p260). It is a formal relationshipbetween an actor and a forum (Bovens 2007). The second model of accountability,referred to here as relational accountability, is the subject of much debate and is lesssuccinctly defined. Relational accountability is a self-governing form of accountabilitydriven by relationship: “ties of friendship, loyalty and reciprocal obligation” (Roberts1991, p363). It is a “process of dialogue” (Roberts 2002, p660) that serves to developshared understanding between the actor and the forum, and between actors. Relationalaccountability is frequently presented as a solution to the various problems ofaccountability, through relationships (Roberts 1991) and dialogue (Vosselman 2013)where accounts are given freely as testimony (McKernan 2012) enabling an intelligent
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accountability (Roberts 2009) that does not reference external, formal and finite rulesbut “infinite justice” (McKernan and Kosmala 2007, p732). The instrumentalist (or thetelevision interviewer) might argue that such relationship is not only unnecessary butalso unethical, as close relationships might cause the failure of proper accountability.The relationalist could argue that accountability is inherently unethical and paradoxical,driving the need for such relationships to weave together the impossible demands ofaccountability with the practical concerns of professional practice and the personalconcerns of ethics and responsibility.
Comparing instrumental accountability to a legal framework allows it to becontrasted with relational accountability as an example of the difference between lawand justice. As such, instrumental and relational accountability are not distinctcategories, but an “aporetic entanglement” (McKernan and Kosmala 2007, p739) withinwhich both are needed, and each influences the other. Instrumental accountabilitydefines the relationship and the expectations. A specific accountability relationship canbe defined in terms of the forum, actor, conduct and obligation (Bovens 2007). Thecomplexity and contradictions inherent in the lived experience of that accountabilityrelationship can then be managed intelligently (Roberts 2009) through a process ofdialogue.
Whilst a convincing theory with a clear need, relational accountability isnonetheless rather woolly. It is a complex construct that can only be fully understood incontext, by insiders. This is unacceptable given that accountability is fundamentallyabout external scrutiny (Mulgan 2000a). Accountability is stringently applied in the
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public sector, particularly with regard to policy (Mulgan 2000b). As such, the need fortransparency and public scrutiny will always give instrumental accountability the upperhand when tough questions are raised.
Problems with accountability
Empirical studies of accountability have shown that it has both positive and negativeeffects (Mero et al. 2014). This finding is not unexpected, given the complexity thataccountability presents. Here we discuss four unresolved problems with accountabilityin order to develop the link between accountability and organisational learning. Thefirst problematic element of accountability occurs when the requirement to give anaccount disrupts practice itself. This is highly likely because a good deal of expertpractice is applied automatically (Nightingale 2003) such as the intuitive making ofdecisions (Messner 2009). The need to give an account adds cognitive load in a similarway to narrating during a driving test, and therefore changes the task itself. As such,“accountability is the condition of becoming a subject who might be able to give anaccount” (Roberts 2009, p959). The demand for an account is considered to be unethicalboth because it disrupts practice and because it asks for an account of what issometimes unconscious and unknowable. At the same time, “A manager who cannotexplain why he has taken a certain decision… will not readily be called a responsiblemanager” (McKernan 2012, p260). In this reporting conundrum the requirement to givean account is always essential, and sometimes impossible.
A second problematic element of accountability is the complexity of work forpublic officials, who must work within “a web of multiple, overlapping accountability
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relationships” (Roberts 2002, p658). Accountability for practicing managersencompasses multiple conflicting meanings (Sinclair 1995) that change with context. Itis argued that “expecting that person to measure up to multiple and conflictingaccountabilities is itself ethically questionable” (Messner 2009, p919). In this publiccomplexity conundrum it is either not possible to demand a true accountability, or it isnot ethical to demand a true and conflicting accountability.
The third issue regarding accountability is the moral conflict and apparentparadox presented by autonomy: “where people break with the duties authoritativelyimposed on them by their role they seem, almost by definition, to behave irresponsibly,unaccountably. On the other hand there is an understanding that there can be no realpersonal responsibility or accountability in the absence of autonomy” (McKernan 2012,p260). Accountability for a mandated purpose removes personal responsibility for itseffects. Behaviour that is in compliance is deemed acceptable, and so in following therules “morality is reduced to well-understood self-interest” (Vosselman 2013, p10). Thisis contrasted with the problem of having the accountable individual define the purpose,thus becoming answerable only to themselves (Roberts 2002). In this moral conundrumwe are either not personally responsible, or not accountable, and this tension is a keychallenge when considering accountability to hierarchy.
The fourth problematic element of accountability is based on the desire to avoidpunishment or loss of face. Punishment avoidance leads to selective reporting. Themechanisms used to promote and encourage accountability actually discourage thebehaviours they are designed to ensure (Jos and Tompkins 2004). Instead of enhancing
Page 15 of 38
performance, accountability measures often lead to gaming behaviours (Busuioc andLodge 2016). In this punishment conundrum it is either not possible to get an accuratereport on performance, or high performance standards are not shown to be required.Punishment avoidance is also a key issue for organisational learning as it may preventopenly reflecting on errors.
Recognising that accountability presents a highly complex background, the nextsection discusses how organisational learning is impacted by accountability. Twoproblematic accountability issues, punishment avoidance and hierarchy, will be furtherdiscussed.
Accountability and Organizational LearningIn the context of organizational learning, accountability includes a dual commitment tolearn and to take corrective action (Lipshitz et al. 2002). This can be articulated as “Weclearly understood that the incident and the implementation of changes was ourresponsibility” (Naot, Lipshitz, and Popper 2004, p460). Defined in this way,accountability contributes towards productive organizational learning (Taylor et al.2010), and forms an essential part of a learning culture (Naot et al. 2004). Since errorsare both inevitable and opportunities for learning (Ron et al. 2006), being accountablefor personal failures means reporting on them in order to avoid reproducing them thenext time a similar situations is encountered (Godé and Barbaroux 2012). Within aneffective learning culture, some learning mechanisms are said to increase the sense ofpersonal accountability (Vashdi et al. 2007), although psychological safety is required ifthis is to be effective.
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The requirement to admit mistakes relates to a key problem of accountability,which can hinder organizational learning (Ebrahim 2005). The avoidance of punishmentis the basis of the view that accountability has a negative impact on learning (e.g. Bapuji2004). A punitive approach in which reporting on failures leads to punishment “isinconsistent with a non-evaluative and safe atmosphere that promotes learning” (Ron etal. 2006, p1078). This may be caused in part by defensive bolstering: the desire to avoidblame (Morris and Moore 2000). A positive and encouraging culture would enable “anopen, free, non-punitive environment in which people can feel safe to report adverseevents and near misses” (Catino and Patriotta 2013, p442). A tolerance for failure isfrequently presented as a required policy for successful organizational learning(Agazzini, Pammolli, and Riccaboni 2012; Taylor et al. 2010), with the primary objectiveto learn in order to adapt and improve (Lukic, Margaryan, and Littlejohn 2010).However, the solution of a no-blame approach to encourage and enable learning fromerrors (Provera et al. 2010) is not a clear-cut, simple choice. In the safety domain inparticular, there is a fine line between encouraging learning and promoting an anything-goes environment in which mistakes need not be avoided in the first place (Ron et al.2006). Whilst this is clearly a worthy aim, very few organizations successfully managethis tension (Williams 2008).
Hierarchy is also a critical factor influencing learning, as identified in a series ofexperiments showing that learning is inhibited by accountability to organizationalsuperiors (Morris and Moore 2000). Intricately related to hierarchy, leadership has alsobeen shown to be the single most important factor influencing the quality oforganizational learning (Naot et al. 2004), including their receptiveness to ideas,
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impartiality, personal accountability and not blaming others. This is intrinsic to themultifacet model shown in Figure 1 (Lipshitz et al., 2002).
Punishment avoidance and allegiance to hierarchy share some commoncharacteristics, since it is within the organisational hierarchy that punishment isenacted. These factors are critical within a public sector setting, and more so in amilitary setting where a strong sense of hierarchy is a required feature.
Literature summaryIt is clear that organizational learning is beneficial, and the case for learning isparticularly strong where safety is concerned. If problems, errors or near misses areidentified, they can be elevated to a level where corrective action can be taken toprevent them. Effective organisational learning requires a safe atmosphere wherereporting does not lead to punishment (Ron et al. 2006), since a punitive framework canhinder organizational learning (Bapuji 2004). There is a balance to be struck betweenencouraging people to report problems freely and encouraging responsible behaviour,and the proposed solution in the literature is to focus accountability on learning ratherthan on reporting (Ebrahim 2005; Greiling and Halachmi 2013b).
The practical observation that prompted this study was that two organisationallearning systems appeared to perform very differently. The nature of accountability ineach system will be investigated as a potential cause of this difference, with particularreference to hierarchy and punishment avoidance. The research question is: To what
extent does accountability explain the difference in perceived performance of the two
organizational learning frameworks ‘Air Safety’ and ‘Air Lessons’?
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Organizational Context: the case study organizationThe stated mission of the Royal Air Force (RAF) is to: “Produce a battle-winning agile airforce: fit for the challenges of today; ready for the tasks of tomorrow; capable of buildingfor the future; working within Defence to achieve shared purpose” (RAF, 2016).Collaboration, learning and adaptation are all key components of this mission. As apublic sector body responsible for the lives of its pilots, aircrew, all of its 43,000 regularand reserve personnel as well as the air defence of the United Kingdom, the RAF clearlyrepresents a high-accountability work context (Vashdi et al. 2007). As an organizationrequired to engage in war, conflict situations and anti-terrorism, learning in order toachieve competitive advantage is a matter of life and death.
The two organizational learning frameworks we examine are Air Safety and Air
Lessons. The Air Safety Management Plan describes a detailed process to identify, assess,record and undertake action to mitigate risks across the entire organization. Air Safety ismanaged tactically at station level by dedicated personnel, and strategic control is heldby the Military Aviation Authority. The Air Lessons Directive emphasises the importanceof organizational learning as a key component of competitive advantage. It describes acyclical learning process of capture, learn, analyse and exploit that should be applied toall projects, operations and exercises. The Air Lessons framework is part of the widerMinistry of Defence lessons management process. This framework is less prescriptive atthe unit level, and analysis of captured lessons is carried out centrally.
Air Safety has been significantly influenced by The Nimrod Review (Haddon-Cave2009), and Base Commanders are now legally accountable for safety failures. The
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accountability paradox suggests that punitive action and blame reduce the likelihoodthat individuals will report problems. This would predict that Air Safety would be theleast effective of the two systems. However, this did not align with the operationalexperience of one of the authors, a squadron leader with responsibilities including airbase operations. The Air Safety framework includes scheduled training and experience-sharing. The methods of reporting, briefing and oversight bring about positiveoperational change. There is a tangible culture of openness, and a definite sense ofprioritisation and urgency. The Air Lessons framework, which has no such legal punitiveframework, appears to be significantly less effective. It does not receive the same level ofresource or attention, and the supporting IT system is perceived by some personnel asbeing difficult to use.
These differences raised the question of why one system appeared to operatemuch more effectively than another given the potential issues related to accountability.A further puzzle is the expectation that the positive learning culture within theorganization should apply to both systems. This research sought to identify the differentperceptions held by users of both systems in order to examine the impact ofaccountability. The following section outlines the research method adopted in this study.
MethodThis research sought to investigate the question: To what extent does accountability
explain the difference in perceived performance of the two organizational learning
frameworks ‘Air Safety’ and ‘Air Lessons’? in one air base in the RAF. Because we wereseeking to identify the impact of accountability, a recognised and meaningful term
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within the RAF, there was a risk of leading the participants if accountability wasdiscussed directly. The Repertory Grid Technique (Kelly 1955), a well-established non-directive interview method, was applied to discover personal perspectives on theexperience of both systems. The Repertory Grid Technique (RGT) allows people toexpress their views in their own terms, minimising the impact of the researcher’sassumptions and bias on the result. RGT is based on the theory that individual actionsare determined by understandings and perceptions of situations, and that thoseunderstandings can be accurately identified (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Holman1996). RGT is particularly suitable in exploratory settings (Goffin 2002), and althoughthis research has a defined theoretical focus, the complexity and contradictions relatingto accountability mean an exploratory approach is suitable.
The repertory grid interview includes three essential constituents: elements,constructs and linking mechanisms (Easterby-Smith et al. 1996). Elements are theobjects of thought; the subject of study. In this study, elements were provided that relateto key components of the two systems, designed to reflect terms that are recognisablefor the interviewees. The terms were intended to be representative of the everydayexperience, but generic enough to allow a wide ranging comparison. Accountability wasnot a provided element, as this research sought to discover the extent to whichaccountability impacts on the two learning frameworks. Instead, we looked at relevantaspects of IT systems which the literature identified as important. This is a broadsubject, and it is accepted that adopting such systems is complex and relies on a numberof factors (e.g. Brown et al., 2014; Deng and Chi, 2012; Stein et al., 2015). We classifiedkey ideas into five major themes.
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Usability relates to the overall user experience with the system: is it easy toaccess, add content, and search? This is a functional technological issue relating to theusability of the IT system (Burke, 2013; Prat et al., 2015; Saadé and Bahli, 2005; Schillingand Kluge 2009; Venkatesh, 2000; Venkatesh et al., 2016 ). Systems perceived as notbeing easy to use are unlikely to deliver the benefits anticipated, so this is a key factor toascertain. Content Quality relates to the perceived inherent quality of the existinginformation within each system, chosen because content quality is critical to learning(Haas and Hansen 2007; Moges et al., 2016; Nelson et al., 2005; Yen et al., 2015).
Training refers to the availability of and experience with formal training for eachsystem, as a critical feature of organizational learning (Camps and Luna-Arocas 2012;Davis and Davis, 1990; Gallivan et al., 2005; Lorenzo et al., 2009; Sharma and Yetton,2007; Sykes, 2015). Importance relates to the perception of each system in broad terms– how important is it; what level of priority does it have within the work context?(Drnevich & Croson, 2013; Liang et al., 2015; Liang, 2015; Polites & Karahanna, 2013;Yen et al., 2015). This element provides opportunity for a detailed comparison of twoimportant systems. Finally, Assurance refers to the practices of assuring content qualityand managing risks associated with the use, processing and storage of information in thetwo systems. Assurance is an enabling factor for effective learning (Greiling andHalachmi, 2013b; Park et al., 2015; Spears et al., 2013; Zheng et al., 2013).
The provided elements representing the experience of using the two learningframeworks were:
1. Air Safety Usability
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2. Air Safety Content Quality3. Air Safety Training4. Air Safety Importance5. Air Safety Assurance6. Air Lessons Usability7. Air Lessons Content Quality8. Air Lessons Training9. Air Lessons Importance10. Air Lessons Assurance
The interview process was carried out according to the recommended method(Easterby-Smith et al. 1996), ensuring that we can faithfully reflect the personalconstruct system (Kelly 1955) of each participant. The ten elements shown above werewritten onto ten cards. Participants were provided with a randomly selected set of threecards (a triad), and asked the following question: “can you tell me how two of these aresimilar, and different from the third”. This allows (and requires) the participant torespond in their own terms about how the elements are related, a key mechanism ofdiscovering their personal construct system. For each triad, the interviewer sought toidentify a construct and a counterpole by reflecting back to the interviewee and askingfor clarification until a clear construct and counterpole was articulated. As an example ofthe output, the first construct provided by Participant A was ‘Self-Guided’ andcounterpole was ‘Taught’. This referred to the lack of formal training available for theAir Lessons system. The second construct provided by Participant A was ‘Jargon Heavy’,with the counterpole ‘Clearly Articulated’. This referred to the differences in style in the
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content of the reports. Additional comments were recorded during the interviewprocess to add depth to the findings and clarify any ambiguous constructs, with the aimof supporting the coding process (see Koners & Goffin 2007). The interview process isthen repeated with a new triad, continuing until no new constructs can be elicited.
An initial pool of 21 subjects was selected, based on recommendations fromprevious research (Goffin 1994; Jankowicz 2001). Participants were managers ofdeployable aviation units, currently or recently (within the last 12 months) closelyinvolved in both the Air Lessons and Air Safety Management frameworks in aprofessional capacity. In advance of the repertory grid interview, participants wereasked some background questions, including the number of years’ service in the RAFand their level of experience and frequency of interaction with both systems. Two trialinterviews were conducted to test the suitability and clarity of the interview process.The interviewees were typical of the research subjects in profession and experience. Theinterview process was found to be suitable and remained unchanged with the exceptionof the refinement of the example given by the interviewer to illustrate the repertory gridprocess. The data from the pilot interviews were incorporated into the final results.
ResultsA total of 15 interviews took place. The interview duration ranged from 47 to 125minutes with a mean of 79 minutes. Service length of the subjects ranged from 12 to 43years with a mean service length of 18.5 years. All subjects were managers involved inthe delivery of operations, exercises and projects, and all had a managerialresponsibility for Air Safety. Some preliminary questions were used for each participant.
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All subjects described themselves as currently responsible for utilising both the AirSafety Management and the Air Lessons systems. Frequency of interaction ranged fromdaily to monthly with the majority using the Air Safety system more frequently than theAir Lessons system. The level of comfort/familiarity with each system was also rated ona 5-point scale (1 = low, 5=high). The range of comfort/familiarity with the Air Safetyframework was between 3 and 5, with a mean of 3.9. The range for the Air Lessonsframework was 2 to 4, with a mean of 3.1. All subjects reported higher comfort andfamiliarity with Air Safety than Air Lessons.
After the first ten interviews were completed, clear trends were emerging withthe constructs elicited from the interview subjects falling into broad themes. No obviousnew themes emerged between the 10th and 15th interview as which point the interviewprocess was terminated as thematic/data saturation had been reached, indicating anadequate sample size (Eisenhardt 1989; O’Reilly and Parker 2013). In total, 119construct pairs were obtained. The number of constructs elicited from each interviewranged from 5 to 13, with a mean of 7.9.
An overview of the scores assigned to the ten provided elements is shown inTable 1. The interview protocol requires the participant to select their preferredconstruct pole, which is assigned the score 5. For example, the construct ‘GoodAwareness’ has the counterpole ‘Poor Awareness’. In this case the preferred pole is‘Good Awareness’, which is assigned the score of 5. ‘Poor Awareness’ is assigned a scoreof 1. A high aggregate score therefore indicates that the element fares better in the eyesof the participant; it is ‘preferred’. Using this method, the ‘most preferred’ elements can
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be identified. It is notable from the results that the top 5 scoring elements are all fromthe Air Safety framework, and that the bottom 5 scoring elements are all from the AirLessons framework. This validates the initial suggestion that Air Safety is the moreeffective of the two learning frameworks.
------Insert Table 1 about here------
A thematic analysis of the constructs was carried out using the Facets of OrganizationalLearning (FOL) model (Lipshitz et al. 2002) as a coding template. This model (Figure 1)was shown to be appropriate to use in this particular context. Each construct pair wasevaluated and compared to the title and definition of each of the FOL categories.Reference was made to the additional descriptive text captured alongside each constructpair. A summary of the results is shown in Table 2.
------Insert Table 2 about here------
As shown in Table 2, the most frequently occurring category was Commitment toLearning. This category was very broad, including references to resources, training,promotion and importance. The second most frequently referenced category wasOrganizational Learning Mechanisms (OLMs), which includes references made to theorganizational learning systems, their usability and design, structure, uniformity andterminology. The third most frequently referenced category was accountability, whichwill subsequently be discussed in more detail. Fourth was Committed Leadership,including references to the culture of learning (as promoted by leaders), seniormanagement focus and attention, and the presence of local champions. Fifth, and withonly four constructs, is Proximity to Core Mission. This included references to the
Page 26 of 38
importance of the learning systems, and the relationship between learning andperformance. Environmental uncertainty (here relating to the stability of internalprocesses) and psychological safety (relating the presence of a blame culture) each hadtwo included constructs. A number of categories had a single construct: task structure,tolerance for error, organizational commitment, and inquiry. Surprisingly, several of thecategories from the FOL model had no associated constructs: error criticality,commitment to the workforce, transparency, integrity, and issue orientation. In thesafety domain, error criticality would appear to be an important issue. However, thiswas not specifically identified as a relevant feature according to the personal constructsystems of the participants. It is possible, though, that it is so engrained in dailyoperations that it is implicit in the respondents’ other answers. Commitment to theworkforce was covered to some degree by psychological safety and tolerance for error,both relating to the presence of a blame culture. Content assigned to the ‘other’ categorywas rather wide ranging and (as expected within the repertory grid method) somewhatidiosyncratic, although one emerging theme related to the degree of direct relevance tothe user, including e.g. relevant/not relevant; theoretical/practical; benefit apparent /not apparent; target understood / lack of clear goals.
DiscussionThe literature review identified that accountability is a key component of effectiveorganizational learning. This was confirmed by a non-directed (i.e. we did not ask aboutaccountability) repertory grid study of two organizational learning systems in the RAF,where 17 constructs (14% of 119) were identified as relating to accountability. Severalof these constructs specifically mention accountability: ‘High accountability’ (Participant
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B), ‘Clear individual accountability’ (Participant D), ‘Owners held to account’ (ParticipantF), ‘Promotes accountability’ (Participant G), ‘Good accountability’ (Participant H) and
‘Personal accountability’ (Participant N). Some were related to accountability throughthe additional comments, for example the construct ‘Carried out thoroughly’ wasdescribed with the comment “Named individuals ensure Air Safety Management is done”(Participant A). Other constructs were indirectly related to accountability, for examplethe construct ‘Confidence in process’ was followed up with “Who gets in trouble for notsubmitting Air Lessons?” (Participant D). Accountability relates “Named individuals”and “Legal responsibility” through formal methods such as signatures, inspections,enforcement and audit.
Participants felt that when individual accountability is clearly defined, then thosenamed individuals are much more likely to ensure that work gets done on time to a goodstandard. This is related to motivation: “People are motivated if they have something atstake”. Without accountability, it was suggested that staff would pay “lip service”(Participant M) rather than fully engage with the learning system. Motivation wasprimarily discussed with relation to hierarchy, which includes formal inspections andaudits and respect for the chain of command. If a senior officer will later ask whether anamed individual followed up on a specific action, then it is much more likely that it willbe done: “Formal assurance audits in the Air Safety Management framework means thatprocesses are adhered to, which drives best practice” (Participant O). This situation isviewed positively: “Time bounded, targeted and monitored actions for namedindividuals is massively effective” (Participant M). In contrast, it was felt that the AirLessons system was less effective because managers did not always follow up on the
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reports: “Air Safety Management reports are not closed until actions have beenincorporated. Air Lessons recommendations are locked in a drawer” (Participant A).
Air Safety was seen to receive significant leadership attention: “The CO[Commanding Officer] spends 5% of his week analysing safety lessons and ensuring theyare acted upon” (Participant K). Visible leadership attention appears to be a criticalfactor, since senior officers “…lead from the top. Managers have the biggest influence inwhat they do not what they say” (Participant F). Accountability to hierarchy appears todrive performance, but it is reported in the literature as a key factor that can inhibitlearning (Morris and Moore 2000). Closely related, punishment avoidance is a keycomponent of the accountability paradox (Jos and Tompkins 2004). Some participantsreflected on the impact of accountability to hierarchy: “A personal letter detailing you asliable from your boss's boss focuses the mind but it can also cripple an individual’stolerance of risk” (Participant M). In this case, having a clear and defined obligation andpenalty for not acting means that action is much more likely to be carried out, but thesense of risk might change how it is carried out. Being held to account is expected tochange how individuals act (Roberts 2009). The contrasting situation, where there is“No penalty for poor Air Lessons utilisation” (Participant N) leads to a lower attention,commitment and usage rate. The punishment conundrum does appear to apply to thesedifferences, but not in the way we expected. Based on the literature, we predicted thatpunishment avoidance would reduce the likelihood of accurate reporting on anythingother than high achievement. The Air Safety framework sets high standards forreporting and action, and does apply penalties, and yet both reports and subsequentactions are carried out in accordance with best practice. In contrast, an expectation of
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high performance on operations appears to influence the nature of the reporting withinthe Air Lessons framework, which is not carried out to the same high standards.
The moral conundrum means that accountability to organisational superiorseither removes true individual choice, or that people define their own purpose and thusare not truly accountable. Carrying out the mandated purpose may be a free choicedriven by personal integrity, but also serves the individual’s reputation. Within the AirSafety framework, the moral issue was raised: “Are people doing things to keep fromgetting in trouble or for the genuine good of the service?” (Participant H). Reputationhas been presented as an explanatory factor behind both the continued popularity ofaccountability, and the individual behaviours that occur within an accountabilityframework (Busuioc and Lodge 2016). Reporting on human failings aligned with themandated purpose for the Air Safety framework, and so it enhanced individualreputation. Reporting on failures went against the mandated purpose for operations,and so it diminished individual reputation. This apparent negative effect is illustrated bythe following quote: “It is perceived as a positive character trait to admit human factorfailings. It is not a positive thing to fail to deliver operational output” (Participant E).Contribution to the Air Safety system is recognised as valuable in itself, even where itreferences human error. In contrast, reporting on a failed exercise is not primarily seenas a valuable learning opportunity, and a negative report reflects badly on theaccountable individual. When reporting on errors or failures, the question of “Does itbenefit the user’s status at work?” (Participant G) is answered differently for eachsystem. As a result, reporting is different: “PXRs [Air Lessons reports] are less honest
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than Safety reports as performing well on exercise is considered as important as beingopen in Safety matters in enhancing reputation” (Participant K).
Through our comparison of two learning frameworks, we found that the ability toenhance individual reputation aligns with the learning goal in one system but not in theother. The formal directives and chain of command explicitly drive accountability for
learning (Ebrahim 2005; Greiling and Halachmi 2013b) in the Air Safety framework,where reporting on safety failures helps to enhance the reputation of the individualreporting the problem. In contrast, reporting on operational failures in the Air Lessonssystem damages the reputation of the officer accountable for the operation. The AirSafety framework therefore illustrates how accountability to hierarchy can enablelearning, if the learning objectives align with the objectives of the senior leaders.Following the Nimrod review, a new mandate to improve safety was introduced to theRAF by the UK government, alongside an accountability framework that required namedindividuals to be held personally and legally accountable for any safety failure that couldhave been prevented by following proper process. This punitive framework had thepotential to prevent reporting and learning due to punishment avoidance behaviours.The actual result was an effective implementation of an active safety culture that isdedicated to reporting problems and errors, and to correcting them. In contrast, the AirLessons framework is inhibited by individual accountability for operationalperformance rather than accountability for learning. The challenge for the Air Lessonsframework is to change the view of reporting operational failures from a negative to apositive act, and a key element seems to be the cultural (unofficial) negativereputational effect of reporting errors.
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This paper is necessarily limited by the sample size of the respondents and thesingle location used for the study. However, we believe this to be a valuable study whichenhances our understanding of both accountability and organizational learning. Themajority of empirical work on accountability has been carried out in laboratory settings(Mero et al. 2014), which limits the potential for discovering the complex web ofinterconnecting and conflicting accountabilities that work (Roberts 2009), andespecially public sector work (Roberts 2002), entails. Our contribution has been todiscuss in some detail the reasons why accountability can influence two organisationallearning systems in the same organization in different ways. Accountability has asignificant impact on organisational learning, but previous discussions do notsufficiently account for its complexity. In particular, it was not clear that multiplelearning cultures could exist within a single organization. Accountability is defined as arelationship (Bovens 2007) rather than as a single organizational construct, and this hasimportant implications for organisational learning. This finding provides someimportant avenues for further research.
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Figure 1: Facets of Organizational Learning (Lipshitz et al. 2002)
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Table 2: Summary of the coding process
Subject code Definition Count As a%
Error criticality Immediacy and seriousness of the consequencesof errors 0 0%
Environmental
uncertainty Rate of change and intensity of competition 2 2%
Task structure Working methods 1 1%
Proximity to core
mission Learning relates to the core mission 4 3%
Committed leadership Leadership commitment and support for learning 11 9%
Tolerance for error Balancing sanctioning errors in the service oflearning with accountability 1 1%
Commitment to
Learning Strategy and action that learning is essential 43 36%
Commitment to the
workforce
Learning will not be punished - errors in the
service of learning are valued 0 0%
Psychological safety People feel safe to make errors and honestlydiscuss them 2 2%
Organizational
commitment
People identify with the goals and values and seek
to achieve them 0 0%
Transparency Exposing thoughts and actions to feedback 0 0%
Integrity Providing information regardless of theimplications 0 0%
Issue orientation Relevance of the information, not rank 0 0%
Inquiry Persisting until full understanding is achieved 1 1%
Accountability Responsibility for learning and implementinglessons 17 14%
OLMs Organizational subsystems in which membersinteract for the purpose of learning 23 19%
Other Not matching these definitions 14 12%
